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1 
This appeal is about two issues: 
1. Probable cause to effect a warrantless arrest. 
2. Evidence admissibility in the absence of probable cause. 
This appeal is not about police misstatements. 
Conclusions 
Precise relief sought^ 
REBUTTAL ARGUMENT 
This Court has recognized the existence and validity of three distinct levels of 
police intrusion in State v. Contrel, 886 p. 2d. 107. Ut. App. (1994). 
1. An officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose questions so long as the 
citizen is not detained against his will. 
2. An officer may seize a person if the officer has an articulable suspicion that the 
person has committed or is about to commit a crime: however, the detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effecuate the purpose of the stop. 
3. An officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offence has been committed or is being committed. 
Mr. Singletons point is that what the Officer observed coupled with the 
information he had falls within the category of a level 2 detention. He could have 
obtained more information very easily, but he chose not to do so. Another very simple 
course of action to establish probable cause or the lack thereof was available. There were 
two police officers on the scene. There was obviously sufficient suspicion of criminal 
conduct to justify a detention while further investigation was conducted. A call to the 
Lehi Police department to obtain the source of the information that caused them to report 
the occupants of the truck as being intoxicated and another call to the source of that 
information may not have produced any further evidence, but it is highly likely that it 
would have. Either way it would be easier to accept the course of action that was taken 
knowing that the officers had at least done everything that they could to establish a strong 
probable cause for arrest. The course of action that was taken is just not acceptable as a 
professional approach. 
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Cases cited: 
State vs. Contrel. 886 P. 2d 107 (Utah Ct App. 1994) 
ISSUES ADDRESSED: 
Three distinct levels of police intrusion: 
1. Any time approach with no detention. 
2. Seizure with articulator suspicion. 
3. Arrest based on probable cause. 
II 
CONCLUSIONS 
Unless this Court is prepared to hold that encountering a suspect who is identified 
as the driver of a motor vehicle, without any evidence of improper driving, who smells of 
alcohol, has red glassy eyes and is slightly swaying, is belligerent, refuses to cooperate 
with field tests and denies having been drinking, constitutes probable cause for arrest, 
without further observation and without further inquiry into facts that are readily available 
it can only conclude that a level 2 detention was all that is constitutionally justified and 
the arrest cannot be supported. Nor can additional evidence obtained following a promise 
that the Defendant can go home if he cooperates or be incarcerated if he does not be 
admissible as acceptable conduct. 
PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Mr. Singleton asks this Honorable Court to reverse the order of the Trial 
Court denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained following his arrest at the 
American Fork Police Station and the entry of an order of it's own that said motion is 
granted. Costs are not sought. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of November, 2003 
Noall T. Wootton 
Attorney for Appellant 
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•de the case based on expert opinion. On 
* ° ther hand, instruction 20 informed the 
^
6
 °that it could decide the case based on its 
^common experience. These contradicto-
^instructions created a high potential for 
confusion. 
The potential for confusion presented in 
the present case is even greater than that 
resented in Nielsen. The court's ruling in 
Nielsen indicates that, had the trial court 
clearly and carefully informed the jury on 
which instruction belonged to which theory of 
negligence, it would have been permissible to 
^e the inconsistent jury instructions. Id. 
By contrast, in the present case the trial 
court dismissed Mrs. Brady's res ipsa loqui-
tur claim, leaving only the common law theo-
ry of negligence, but nevertheless instructed 
the jury on the common knowledge excep-
tion—an instruction generally used only 
when res ipsa loquitur is a viable theory. 
See Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 
(Utah 1980) (common knowledge exception is 
the basis for res ipsa loquitur theory of negli-
gence).2 By dismissing Mrs. Brady's res 
ipsa loquitur theory of negligence, and yet 
still giving the common knowledge exception 
instruction, the trial court created a situation 
in which no amount of explanation could have 
staved off the potential jury confusion. 
There remained no theory of negligence in 
the case to which the common knowledge 
exception could apply. See Nielsen, 830 P.2d 
at 274 (common knowledge exception applies 
to res ipsa loquitur theory while other in-
structions apply only to common law negli-
"gence theory). 
The instructions given in the present case 
created a high potential for confusion. We 
conclude that the error was prejudicial in 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
jury's verdict may have been different absent 
the error. See Joseph v. W.H. Groves Lat-
*
 T
"
e
 common knowledge exception instruction 
can be used under a common law theory of 
negligence in certain limited circumstances. See 
Predrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772 
U951), overruled on other grounds, Swan v. 
u»nb,m P.2d 814 (Utah 1978). To allow the 
exception for common law negligence in this 
case, we would have to say that it is within a 
person 's common knowledge eitfier that no 
substance should ever be placed in the eye or 
348 P.2d 935, 938 (1960). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred by giving contradicto-
ry and potentially confusing jury instruc-
tions. We reverse the jury verdict as it 
pertains to Dr. Gibb and remand for proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. In light of 
our disposition, we do not reach Dr. Gibb's 
additional issues on appeal. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JACKSON and WILKINS, JJ., concur. 
O £ KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
^ 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
James J. CONTREL, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 930588-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 1, 1994. 
Defendant was convicted on conditional 
plea of guilty entered in the Fourth District 
Court, Juab County, Ray M. Harding, to 
drug-related charge, and he appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Davis, J., held that: (1) 
evidence supported finding that police officer 
had articulable suspicion of unlawful drug-
related activity so as to justify investigative 
stop of defendant's vehicle, and (2) Utah 
Constitution did not require that officer in-
that Exidine is hazardous to eye tissue. We 
recognize, however, that substances are placed 
in eyes for all sorts of reasons, including surgical 
procedures. Similarly, we recognize that the 
hazards of Exidine to eye tissue are beyond the 
common knowledge of a layperson. Therefore, 
once the trial court dismissed Mrs. Brady's res 
ipsa loquitur theory, the common knowledge ex-
ception was no longer available. 
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form defendant of his right to refuse consent 
to search in order for consent to be valid. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <3=>1139, 1158(2) 
Although trial court's determination of 
whether specific set of facts gives rise to 
reasonable suspicion for stop of vehicle is 
determination of law and is reviewable non-
deferentially for correctness, reasonable-sus-
picion legal standard is one that conveys 
measure of discretion to trial judge when 
applying standard to given set of facts, and 
de novo review is not warranted. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4; Const. Art. 1, § 14; U.C.A. 
1953, 77-7-15. 
2. Arrest <3=>63.5(4) 
Police officer may complete nonconsen-
sual investigative stop and stay within bound-
aries drawn by Constitution if officer is able 
to point to objective, specific, and articulable 
facts that warrant intrusion upon person. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4; Const. Art. 1, 
§ 14; U.C.A.1953, 77-7-15. 
3. Arrest <3=>63.5(6) 
Evidence supported finding that police 
officer had reasonable suspicion of unlawful 
drug-related activity, thus justifying investi-
gative stop of vehicle; vehicle had structural 
modifications similar to those previously ob-
served by officer in seizing another vehicle 
that had been found to have hidden compart-
ment containing contraband. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4; Const. Art 1, § 14; U.C.A. 
1953, 77-7-15. 
4. Searches and Seizures ^ 1 8 3 
Utah Constitution does not require law 
enforcement officer to inform person of his 
or her right to refuse consent to search in 
order for consent to be valid; rather, such 
knowledge is merely factor in analyzing vol-
untariness of consent. Const. Art. 1, § 14. 
5. Criminal Law ^1158(2) 
Whether trial court erred in concluding 
that knowing consent to search was not re-
quired, i.e., that consent did not depend on 
knowledge that consent could be withheld, 
was question of law subject to review for 
correctness, with no deference being accord-
ed to trial courts determination. Const. Art. 
1, § 14. 
G. Fred Metos and Stephen R. McCau-
ghey, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Jan Graham and Todd A. Utzinger, Salt 
Lake City, for appellee. 
Before DAVIS, JACKSON and 
GREENWOOD, JJ. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
Defendant James J. Contrel appeals from 
a conditional guilty plea to unlawful posses-
sion of a controlled substance, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1994), a 
third degree felony. On appeal, defendant 
challenges the trial court's conclusion that 
the officers' stop was legal, and that article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution does not 
require a knowing consent. We affirm. 
FACTS 
At approximately 2:00 p.m. on February 4, 
1992, while Sergeant Paul Mangelson and 
Trooper Lance Bushnell were patrolling 1-15 
within Juab County, Sergeant Mangelson 
saw a pickup truck and made the following 
observations: the vehicle was a late model 
Chevrolet pickup truck; the heavy-duty 
chrome metal bumper had been bent upward; 
the gas tank was lower than that of a stock 
model truck; the truck had been recently 
undercoated; unlike stock model pickup 
trucks, the vehicle had no air space between 
the truck bed and the frame; and the vehicle 
had heavy duty shock absorbers, a bed liner, 
and a tool box in the bed area. Sergeant 
Mangelson noted that the vehicle was identi-
cal in every respect, except for its color, to a 
vehicle he had seized several months earlier 
containing a secret compartment behind the 
bumper in which Sergeant Mangelson discov-
ered large quantities of contraband. 
Based upon Sergeant Mangelson's obser-
vations and his prior experience,1 the officers 
1. The trial court found that Sergeant Mangelson has had extensive training in drug law enforce-
STATE v. CONTREL Utah 109 
Cite as 886 P.2d 107 (UtahApp. 1994) 
Defendant, the driver Mangelson to stop defendant's vehicle. "[A] the vehicle. 
/ehicle, produced a Florida driver's 
and a Pennsylvania registration and 
officers that the vehicle belonged to 
1. In response to Sergeant Mangel-
quiry, defendant denied the presence 
;s or contraband in the vehicle. Ser-
Mangelson then asked defendant for 
Lsent to search the vehicle, which de-
t gave both orally and in writing. 
int Mangelson went to the rear of the 
j, accessed the secret compartment ex-
LS he had done with the vehicle he had 
several months earlier and discovered 
100 pounds of marijuana. Defendant 
hereafter arrested and charged by in-
tion with possession of a controlled 
ance in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1994), a second degree fel-
fendant moved to suppress the evidence 
ned at the time of his arrest, claiming 
there was an insufficient basis to stop 
vehicle and that article I, section 14 of 
Utah Constitution requires a knowing 
ent. This motion was denied. Defen-
, then entered a conditional guilty plea, 
dfically preserving his right to appeal the 
ag on the motion to suppress. On appeal, 
mdant argues that the denial of his mo-
i to suppress must be reversed because: 
mere alterations to a vehicle consistent 
h a hidden compartment fail to establish a 
isonable suspicion that defendant was in-
ved in the commission of a crime; (2) in 
ier to have a valid consent, article I, sec-
n 14 of the Utah Constitution requires an 
forcement officer to inform an individual of 
3 or her right to refuse consent to search; 
id (3) any consent given to search the vehi-
e lacked attenuation from the initial illegal 
-op, making the evidence seized inadmissi-
le. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Reasonable Suspicion 
[1] Defendant argues that there was no 
articulable, reasonable suspicion for Sergeant 
trial courtf's] determination of whether a 
specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable 
suspicion is a determination of law and is 
reviewable nondeferentially for correct-
ness.. . ." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 
(Utah 1994). Even so, "the reasonable-suspi-
cion legal standard is one that conveys a 
measure of discretion to the trial judge when 
applying that standard to a given set of 
facts." Id. Thus, de novo review is not 
warranted. Id. 
The law in Utah parallels its federal coun-
terpart, delineating three distinct levels of 
police intrusion: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention 
must be temporary and last no longer than 
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause to 
believe an offense has been committed or 
is being committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 
1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States u 
Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984), 
cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1142,106 S.Ct. 2250, 90 
L.Ed.2d 696 (1986) (citation omitted)); State 
v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App.1994) 
(citations omitted). The parties do not dis-
pute that the intrusion in this case was a 
level two seizure. 
[2] The level two intrusion is codified in 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990). Section 
77-7-15 provides that "[a] peace officer may 
stop any person in a public place when he 
has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and 
may demand his name, address and an expla-
volvmg pickup trucks with a hidden compart-
ment 
ment and identification and has been involved m 
numerous cases involving hidden compartments 
c
°ntaming contraband. Moreover, Sergeant 
Mangelson testified that he has performed ap- 2. Defendant ultimately pled guilty to a reduced 
Proximately seven other investigatory stops in- charge of a third degree felony. 
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nation of his actions." Id. If a police officer 
observes conduct that raises a suspicion that 
a crime has been or is being committed, " 'he 
[or she] has not only the right but the duty to 
make observations and investigations to de-
termine whether the law is being violated; 
and if so, to take such measures as are 
necessary in the enforcement of the law/ " 
State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah 
App.1990) (quoting State v. Whittenback, 621 
P.2d 103,105 (Utah 1980)). Notwithstanding 
this duty, the officer must heed the constitu-
tional protections afforded our citizens. Sec-
tion 77-7-15 contemplates that an officer 
may complete a non-consensual investigative 
stop and stay within the boundaries drawn 
by the constitution if the officer is able to 
point to objective, specific, and articulable 
facts which warrant the intrusion upon the 
person. Id. at 541 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 
889 (1968)); see also State u Roth 827 P.2d 
255, 257 (Utah App.1992); State v. Baurn-
gaertel, 762 P.2d 2, 3-4 (Utah App.1988). In 
articulating the facts upon which the officers 
base their suspicions, " 'the officer is entitled 
to assess the facts in light of his experi-
ence/ " Menke, 787 P.2d at 541 (quotation 
omitted); Baumgaertel, 762 P.2d at 4. 
"While the required level of [reasonable] 
suspicion is lower than the standard required 
^for probable cause to arrest, the same totali-
ty of facts and circumstances approach is 
used to determine if there are sufficient 'spe-
cific and articulable facts' to support reason-
able suspicion." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 
1276 (Utah App.1994) (quoting Terry, 392 
U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880). Thus, even 
though "the legal standards and conse-
quences of probable cause and reasonable 
suspicion are distinct," State v. Poole, 871 
P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1994), and Poole was a 
probable cause case, we believe the Poole 
analysis controls the outcome of this case. 
In Poole, the Utah Supreme Court upheld 
the trial court's finding that the totality of 
the circumstances "gave rise to probable 
cause for a search." Id. at 534. Considered 
together, the following factors were sufficient 
3. As applied to the existence of reasonable suspi-
to support a finding of probable cause to 
search: 
First and foremost, the truck had a sig-
nificant and unusual alteration in its bed 
which was in plain view and which con-
cealed a secret compartment. Second, this 
truck was traveling a known drug traffick-
ing route. Third, the compartment was 
discovered by an officer with twenty-four 
years of experience in the field who had 
seen other false beds that contained con-
traband. Fourth, one of the vehicle's pas-
sengers held a large wad of money. Fifth, 
both defendants appeared extremely ner-
vous during the stop. Sixth, the cab of the 
truck contained a wrench with a socket 
that matched the bolt securing the secret 
compartment. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
[3] In this case, Sergeant Mangelson ar-
ticulated objective facts upon which his suspi-
cions were based, including an apparent, sub-
stantial structural modification of the pickup 
truck, in order to create and conceal a hidden 
compartment. Specifically, Sergeant Man-
gelson observed (1) the edge of the rear 
bumper on defendant's truck had been bent 
up at a 45 degree angle; (2) the gas tank was 
much lower than one on a stock model truck; 
(3) the truck had been recently undercoated; 
(4) unlike stock models, there was no air 
space between the truck bed and the frame; 
and (5) the truck had oversized, nonstock 
shock absorbers. Further, these alterations 
made the truck identical in almost every 
respect to a vehicle seized by Sergeant Man-
gelson only a few months earher which had a 
virtually identical hidden compartment con-
taining contraband. The fact of the hidden 
compartment coupled with Sergeant Mangel-
son's extensive experience and the location of 
the offense provides three out of the six 
factors enumerated in Poole. Because sever-
al of the factors present in this case were 
present in Poole, and because the standard 
for reasonable suspicion is lower than the 
standard for probable cause, we find no 
abuse of discretion by the trial court in ap-
plying the articulable facts in the case at bar 
to the reasonable suspicion legal standard 
and concluding that defendant was involved 
in criminal activity.3 
cion within the meaning of Utah Code Ann-
II. Knowing Consent 
i] Defendant requests that this court 
ret article I, section 14 of the Utah 
itution as requiring an enforcement of-
to advise an individual of his or her 
to refuse consent to search. Defendant 
5 that he was not informed of his right 
use consent, and that such failure voids 
msent given. The trial court concluded 
he Utah Constitution does not require a 
ing consent. Whether the trial court 
in this conclusion is a question of law 
1 we review for correctness, according 
sference to the trial court's determina-
Utah Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Wind 
r Petroleum, 881 P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 
) (citations omitted). 
Schieckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the 
ed States Supreme Court expressly re-
id the proposition that the Fourth 
jndment requires an enforcement officer 
tiform a person of his or her right to 
se consent to search. Id. at 248, 93 S.Ct. 
;058. This interpretation of the Fourth 
mdment has been continuously applied in 
h. See State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 
106 (Utah 1980); State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 
, 691 (Utah App.1993); State v. Carter, 
P.2d 460, 468 (Utah App.1991), cert, de-
% 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992); State v. 
wier, "808 P.2d 133, 137 (Utah App.1991); 
te v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah 
p.1990). Defendant asks us to hold that 
Utah Constitution provides broader pro-
STATE v. CONTREL Utah m 
Cite as 886 P.2d 107 (UtahApp. 1994) 
tection than the Fourth Amendment by re-
quiring a knowing consent. Defendant 
claims that "[t]he general purpose of such a 
requirement is to protect citizens from over-
reaching by law enforcement agents who 
may use very subtle, yet coercive means to 
obtain a consent to search." 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined 
that, because article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution is essentially identical to the 
Fourth Amendment,4 no distinctions need be 
drawn "between the protections afforded by 
the respective constitutional provisions. 
Rather, the Court has always considered the 
protections afforded to be one and the same." 
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 
1988). Notwithstanding, 
we have by no means ruled out the possi-
bility of doing so in some future case. 
Indeed, choosing to give the Utah Consti-
tution a somewhat different construction 
may prove to be an appropriate method for 
insulating this state's citizens from the va-
garies of inconsistent interpretations given 
to the fourth amendment by the federal 
courts. 
Id. at 1221 n. 8.5 
Even though Watts authorizes departures 
from Fourth Amendment interpretations, the 
Utah Supreme Court has declined to do so 
with respect to the need for a knowing con-
sent. In Whittenback, the defendant chal-
lenged the propriety of the search of his 
person and his vehicle under both the Fourth 
Amendment and article I, section 14. Whit-
77-7-15 (1990) and authorities cited, our deci-
ion is based upon the unique facts and circum-
tances of this case; we refuse to adopt a per se 
ule which would create a mechanical applica-
ion, authorizing an officer to stop a vehicle any 
ime a hidden compartment exists. 
The Fourth Amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
has only minor differences: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against un-
reasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14. 
5. The Utah Supreme Court has chosen to deviate 
from the protections afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment in only a few instances which are 
unrelated to the case at hand. See, e.g., State v. 
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) (article I, 
section 14 of Utah Constitution provides bank 
customers right of privacy in bank records, while 
Fourth Amendment does not); State v. Larocco, 
19A P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (article I, section 14 
provides privacy interest in automobile interior, 
while Fourth Amendment law is unclear on the 
issue). 
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tenback, 621 P.2d at 105 & n. 5. He claimed 
that, although he had consented to the 
search, the consent was not voluntary. The 
court in Whittenback stated that while the 
prosecution had the burden of proving that 
the consent was voluntary, that burden did 
not include proving "that defendant knew of 
his right to refuse consent in order to show 
voluntariness." Id. at 106. Thus, in addition 
to adhering to Fourth Amendment interpre-
tations, Utah case law relegates actual 
knowledge of Fourth Amendment and article 
I, section 14 rights to a factor in analyzing 
voluntariness, and we decline defendant's in-
vitation to depart from the current status of 
the law.6 
CONCLUSION 
Under the narrow facts in this case, we 
affirm the trial court's ruling that Sergeant 
Mangelson had reasonable suspicion to be-
lieve that defendant was committing a crime.7 
Further, we decline to interpret article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution as requir-
ing a knowing consent. Affirmed. 
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
J^\ , 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Anthony M. GORDON, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 940345-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 1, 1994. 
Defendant was convicted in the Second 
District Court, Weber County, Michael J. 
6. We note, with interest and concern, that the 
civil law affords our citizens greater protection 
from an unknowing waiver of a contractual or 
economic right than the criminal law from an 
unknowing waiver of a constitutional right. See 
Soter's v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan, 857 P.2d 935, 
Glasmann, J., of aggravated burglary and 
aggravated kidnapping, and he appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held 
that: (1) prosecutor was not required to stip-
ulate that prosecution witnesses' testimony 
that they had seen defendant at apartment 
complex during period of time that he was 
incarcerated was false; (2) even if there were 
jurors who continued to believe prosecution 
witnesses, testimony, such erroneous impres-
sion was harmless in light of other evidence; 
and (3) it was not necessary for defendant to 
introduce evidence concerning his incarcera-
tion and any error in the introduction of such 
evidence constituted invited error for which 
defendant was not entitled to relief on ap-
peal. 
Affirmed. 
Orme, J., concurred in result. 
1. Criminal Law <3^ 1147 
Trial courts are generally accorded some 
degree of discretion in applying legal stan-
dard to a given set of facts; such discretion 
allows trial court to reach one of several 
possible conclusions about legal effect of a 
particular set of facts without risking rever-
sal. 
2. Criminal Law <s=>867 
Trial court was accorded considerable 
discretion in its decision regarding legal ef-
fect on defendant's trial of incorrect testimo-
ny of prosecution witnesses who stated that 
they saw defendant at apartment complex 
during period of time when defendant was 
incarcerated. 
3. Criminal Law <2>700(1) 
As state's representative, prosecutor has 
duty to see that justice is done. 
4. Constitutional Law <3=*268(9) 
Conviction obtained through false testi-
mony must fall under due process clause of 
942 (Utah 1993) (waiver of contractual right 
must be knowing). 
7. Based on our holding that the stop was legal, 
we need not reach the attenuation issue raised by 
defendant. 
